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Abstract
In this work, we investigate the problem of secure broadcasting over block-fading wiretap channels
with limited channel knowledge at the transmitter. More particularly, we analyze the effect of having
a finite rate feedback on the throughput of multi-user broadcast wiretap channels. We consider that
the transmitter is only provided by a b-bits feedback of the main channel state information (CSI) sent
by each legitimate receiver, at the beginning of each fading block, over error-free public links with
limited capacity. Also, we assume that the transmitter is aware of the statistics of the eavesdropper’s
CSI but not of its channel’s realizations. Under these assumptions of CSI uncertainty, we characterize
the ergodic secrecy capacity of the system when a common message is broadcasted to all legitimate
receivers, the ergodic secrecy sum-capacity when multiple independent messages are transmitted, and
the ergodic secrecy capacity region for the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCCM). In all
three scenarios, we show that as long as the transmitter has some knowledge of the main CSI, obtained
even through a 1-bit CSI feedback, a non-zero secrecy rate can still be achieved. The impact of having
the feedback sent over a binary erasure channel (BEC) is also investigated for the BCCM case. Here
again, and even with the possibility of having the feedback bits erased, a positive secrecy rate can still
be achieved as long as the erasure event is not a probability-one event. An asymptotic analysis of the
obtained results is provided for the high SNR regime, and the scaling law of the system, when the
number of legitimate receivers is large, is also presented.
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erasure channel, limited feedback.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, the security challenge has been mainly addressed at the application layer using
cryptographic techniques. However, with the emergence of ad-hoc and decentralized networks
and the next wave of innovative wireless systems, the need for less complex securing methods
had become a necessity. It is mainly for this reason that wireless physical layer security has
gained a lot of attention from the research community in the last few years. The core idea
behind information theoretic security is to exploit the characteristics of the wireless channel,
such as noise and fading, to limit the amount of information that can be extracted at the
physical layer.
A. Literature Review
The first research steps on information theoretic security were taken by Shannon in his
pioneering work on cipher systems [1]. Shannon showed that a perfectly secure transmission
could be achieved at the bit level using a shared secret key. This key should be, however, at
least as long as the secret message itself, and should only be known by the legitimate entities.
The physical layer security paradigm was extended later on, by Wyner, to a more promising setup
that doesn’t require the use of a secret key [2]. Wyner’s model considers a degraded wiretap
channel where the source exploits the structure of the communication link to transmit a message
reliably to the intended receiver while asymptotically leaking no information to the eavesdropper.
Ulterior works generalized Wyner’s work to the case of non-degraded channels [3], Gaussian
channels [4], and fading channels [5], [6], to cite only a few.
The secrecy performance of multi-user systems has been of interest in a number of recent
research works. For the broadcast multi-user scenario, the secrecy capacity of parallel and fading
channels, assuming perfect main channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter (CSIT), was
considered in [7] and [8] while the case of imperfect main channel estimation was elaborated
in [9]. For the multiple access scenario, the authors in [10] and [11] investigated the secrecy
capacity of degraded wiretap channels. The problem of analyzing the secrecy capacity of multiple
antenna systems has also been of great interest. The secrecy capacity for the multiple-input
single-output (MISO) wiretap Gaussian channel was proven in [12] and [13]. Another work [14]
characterized the secrecy capacity for the MISO case, with a multiple-antenna eavesdropper,
when the main and the eavesdropping channels are known to all terminals. The secrecy capacity
3of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) transmission with a multiple-antenna eavesdrop-
per was considered in [15] and [16] when the channel matrices are fixed and known to all
terminals. The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO broadcast wiretap channel was
derived in [17].
The channel model, presented by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [3], is regarded as the broadcast
channel with confidential messages (BCCM), in which the source also has a common message
to transmit in addition to the confidential message. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel
BCCM and the fading BCCM with perfect CSIT were characterized in [6]. Further results on
the BCCM can be found in [18]–[20].
Taking full advantage of the ability of the physical layer to secure wireless transmissions,
requires a complete knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter (CSIT);
which is difficult to have in practical scenarios. One way to overcome this challenge is by using
feedback. With no secrecy constraints, the finite feedback problem has been extensively studied
in the literature [21]–[26]. For the case of a single user transmission, the secrecy throughput
when the feedback is finite has been investigated in [27] for single antenna wiretap channels,
in [28] and [29] for MIMO block-fading channels, and in [30] for the fast fading MIMO case.
The noise leakage problem when transmitting artificial noise with limited CSI feedback was
analyzed in [31] and [32]. Recently, the work in [33]–[35] investigated the problem of secure
transmission over the wiretap channel with generalized feedback. The considered model assumes
that the transmitter observes general feedback that is correlated to the channel outputs of the
receiver and the eavesdropper. This feedback link is mainly utilized to generate a secret key that
can encrypt the message either wholly or partially. The obtained results show that the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver can agree on a secret key simultaneously with the transmission of a
message. Also, these results represent a generalization of multiple ulterior works.
The uncertainty of the CSIT can also be the result of an error of estimation at the transmitter or
of a delayed feedback information. The authors in the following works, [9], [36]–[39], examined
the case when the uncertainty is the result of an error of estimation, and [40]–[42] considered
the wiretap channel with outdated CSI. A synopsis of how different levels of CSIT impact the
system’s security is provided in [43] and a detailed state-of-the-art review of physical layer
security with CSIT uncertainty is presented in [44].
The particular case where the transmitter does not have any knowledge about the eavesdrop-
per’s channel, not even the statistical knowledge or the distribution of the wiretapper gain, is
4found in the framework of arbitrary varying eavesdropper channel [45]. Under such an assumption
on the eavesdropper’s channel state and assuming that the number of antennas of the eavesdropper
is limited, the authors in [45] derived the secrecy degrees of freedom (SDoF) of the MIMO
wiretap channel. This work was later on extended to the multi-user MIMO setup in [46], [47],
and [48].
B. Contributions Summary
In this work, we aim to analyze and understand the impact of having a limited knowledge
of the CSIT on the ergodic secrecy throughput of multi-user broadcast wiretap channels. In
particular, we assume that the transmitter is unaware of the instantaneous channel gains to the
legitimate receivers and to the eavesdropper and is only provided by a finite CSI feedback.
This feedback is sent by the legitimate receivers through feedback links with limited capacity.
At the difference of [33]–[35], the feedback link is non-secure and is only used to inform the
transmitter about the CSI. Also, we assume that the eavesdropper is aware of the CSI of the
legitimate receivers and of the feedback information. Consequently, the CSI and the feedback
are not a source of secrecy and cannot be used to generate a secret key for the transmitter.
Besides, we consider three different types of broadcast channels, namely the common message
broadcast channel, the independent messages broadcast channel, and the broadcast channel with
confidential messages. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Under the assumption of finite CSI feedback, we provide lower and upper bounds on the
ergodic secrecy capacity and the ergodic secrecy sum-capacity for the common and the
independent messages broadcast channels, respectively. In both transmission scenarios, we
show that even with a 1-bit CSI feedback, sent at the beginning of each fading block, a
positive secrecy rate can still be achieved. For the particular case of infinite feedback, we
prove that our bounds coincide, hence, fully characterizing the secrecy capacity and the
secrecy sum-capacity in this case.
• We investigate the ergodic secrecy capacity region of the multi-user BCCM with finite CSI
feedback. In particular, we consider that the transmitter has a common message intended for
all system users and a confidential information that needs to be kept secret from one of them.
First, we examine the case when the feedback is sent over an error-free link. Interestingly,
we show that the by using the 1-bit feedback as an indication bit that compares the users’
channels, not only can we achieve a positive secrecy rate, but we can also establish the
5converse. Any extra bit that could be fed back should be used to adapt the transmission
power. Then, we extend the obtained result to the case when the feedback is sent over
a binary erasure channel (BEC). Here again, we show that one bit should be used as an
indication bit while the extra bits could be used either as redundant indication bits or to
adapt the power.
• We present an asymptotic study of the obtained results in the high SNR regime. The derived
expressions show that the secrecy throughput is bounded and does not depend on the
transmission power. In the case of independent messages transmission, we characterize
the scaling law of the system and show that even with finite CSI feedback, the secrecy
performance scales with log logK as the number of legitimate receivers K becomes large.
In all cases, we show that as long as the transmitter has some knowledge of the main CSI, a
positive secrecy rate can still be achieved.
C. Outline of the Paper
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. The
main results are summarized in Section III; the secrecy capacity region of the common message
transmission is characterized in subsection III-A, the secrecy sum-capacity of the independent
messages case is analyzed in subsection III-B, and the secrecy capacity region of the BCCM is
considered in subsection III-C. The asymptotic analyses in the high SNR regime are presented
in Section IV. Finally, selected simulation results are illustrated in Section V, and Section VI
concludes the paper.
Notations: Throughout the paper, we use the following notational conventions. The expectation
operation is denoted by E[.], the conditional expectation, given event A, is represented by E
.|A
[.],
log denotes the base two logarithm unless otherwise indicated, and we define {ν}+=max(0, ν).
The entropy of a discrete random variableX is denoted byH(X), and the mutual information be-
tween random variablesX andY is denoted by I(X;Y). We also use the notationX∼CN (µ, σ2)
to indicate that X is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian variable with mean µ and vari-
ance σ2. A sequence of length n is denoted byXn, i.e.,Xn={X(1), X(2), · · ·, X(n)}, a sequence
of elements between i and j, i<j, is denoted by X [i,j], i.e., X [i,j]={X(i), X(i+1), · · ·, X(j)},
X(k) represents the k-th element of Xn, and X(l, k) denotes the k-th element of X in the l-th
fading block.
6II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the problem of secure broadcasting over block-fading wiretap channels when the
transmitter has limited knowledge about the main users’ CSI. The CSI knowledge is obtained
through finite-rate feedback links used by the legitimate receivers to inform the transmitter
about their channel prior to data transmission. The feedback links are public, which implies that
the CSI information cannot be used as a source of secrecy. Our model of interest consists of a
block-fading broadcast wiretap channel where a transmitter (T) communicates with K legitimate
receivers (Rk, k ∈ {1, · · ·, K}) in the presence of an eavesdropper (E), as depicted in Fig. 1. We
consider three different transmission scenarios:
• 1
st scenario: a common message W is broadcasted to all Rk receivers and has to be
kept secret from the eavesdropper. We refer to this scenario as the common message case
(CM case).
• 2
nd scenario: multiple independent messages (W1, · · · ,WK) are transmitted. Message Wk,
k ∈ {1, · · ·, K}, is intended for the kth legitimate receiver Rk, and all K messages has to be
kept secret from the eavesdropper. We refer to this scenario as the independent messages
case (IMs case).
• 3
rd scenario: a common information W0 is transmitted to all system users, including the
eavesdropping node in Fig. 1, while a confidential information W1 is transmitted to the
legitimate receivers Rk only. Message W1 has to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. In
this scenario, the eavesdropper is both a system receiver and an eavesdropper. We denote
it in this case as R/E. We refer to this scenario as the common and confidential messages
case (CCMs case).
A. Received Signals and Channel Assumptions
Regardless of the considered transmission scenario, the received signals at each legitimate
receiver Rk, k ∈ {1, · · ·, K}, and the eavesdropper are respectively given by
Yk(l, j) = hk(l)X(l, j) + vk(l, j)
Ye(l, j) = he(l)X(l, j) + we(l, j),
(1)
where l ∈ {1, · · ·, L}, with L being the number of fading blocks, j ∈ {1, · · · ,κ}, with κ
representing the length of each fading block, X(l, j) is the j-th transmitted symbol in the l-th
fading block, hk(l)∈C, he(l)∈C are the complex Gaussian channel gains corresponding to each
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Fig. 1: Multi-User broadcast wiretap channel.
legitimate channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively, and vk(l, j) ∈ C, we(l, j) ∈ C
represent zero-mean, unit-variance circularly symmetric white Gaussian noises at Rk and E,
respectively. We consider a block-fading channel where the channel gains remain constant within
a fading block. We assume that the channel encoding and decoding frames span a large number
of fading blocks, i.e., L is large, and that the blocks change independently from a fading block
to another. An average transmit power constraint is imposed at the transmitter such that
1
n
n∑
t=1
E
[|X(t)|2] ≤ Pavg, (2)
with n=κL, and where the expectation is over the input distribution. The transmitted signal X
can either corresponds to a common message in the CM case, to a combination of independent
messages in the IMs case, or to a combination of common and confidential messages in the
CCMs case.
The channel gains hk and he are independent, ergodic and stationary with bounded and
continuous probability density functions (PDFs). In the rest of this paper, we denote |hk|2 and
|he|2 by γk and γe, respectively. We assume that each legitimate receiver is instantaneously aware
of its channel gain hk(l), and the eavesdropper knows he(l). The statistics of the main and the
eavesdropping channels are available to all nodes. Further, we assume that the transmitter is
not aware of the instantaneous channel realizations of neither channel, and relies on the CSI
feedback links to acquire knowledge about the legitimate channels.
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Fig. 2: CSI Feedback Model.
9B. Feedback Channel Model
We consider two possible CSI feedback situations, either each legitimate receiver has its own
CSI feedback link to the transmitter, cf. Fig. 2(a), or all receivers have a unique CSI feedback
link that they need to share, cf. Fig. 2(b) and cf. Fig. 2(c). In the latter case, the receivers
cooperate to send the CSI feedback.
In the case of secure common and multiple messages transmissions, we focus on the feedback
model where each receiver has its own CSI feedback link, cf. Fig. 2(a). The adopted strategy
consists, then, on partitioning the main channel gain support into Q intervals [τ1, τ2), · · · ,
[τq, τq+1), · · · , [τQ,∞), where Q=2b. That is, during each fading block, each legitimate re-
ceiver Rk determines in which interval, [τq, τq+1) with q=1, · · · , Q, its channel gain γk lies
and feeds back the associated index q to the transmitter. At the transmitter side, each feed-
back index q corresponds to a power transmission strategy Pq satisfying the average power
constraint. We assume that all nodes are aware of the main channel gain partition intervals
[τ1, τ2), · · · , [τq, τq+1), · · · , [τQ,∞), and of the corresponding power transmission strategies
{P1, · · · , PQ}. Later on in the paper, we will show that the obtained results for the CM case
and the IMs case are also valid when a unique feedback link is available.
When transmitting common and confidential information, we particularly focus on the second
feedback model where a unique CSI feedback link is used, cf. Fig. 2(c). Here again, every
system user, including R/E in this case, has to determine in which partition interval its channel
gain lies. The users should, then, cooperate to decide which channel information to transmit
over the feedback link. We provide more details on this setup in Section III-C, where we also
show how the results change when each receiver has its own CSI feedback link. We consider
both the case when the CSI feedback is sent over an error-free channel, and the case when the
feedback information is sent over a BEC with erasure probability ǫ.
In all scenarios, we consider that the eavesdropping node knows all channel gains and also
tracks all CSI feedback links. Therefore, the feedback information can not be used by the
transmitter as a source of secrecy.
C. Coding for Secrecy
To make the rest of this paper easy to follow, we introduce, here, the adopted coding setup
for each transmission model and define the associated achievable secrecy rates.
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CM case: In the case of common message transmission, a (2nRs, n) code consists of the
following elements:
• A message setW = {1, 2, · · ·, 2nRs} with the messagesW ∈ W independent and uniformly
distributed over W;
• A stochastic encoder f :W → X n that maps each message w to a codeword xn ∈ X n;
• A decoder at each legitimate receiver gk : Ynk →W that maps a received sequence ynk ∈ Ynk
to a message wˆ(k) ∈ W .
A rate Rs is an achievable secrecy rate if there exists a sequence of (2nRs, n) code such that
both the average error probability at each legitimate receiver,
Pek =
1
2nRs
2nRs∑
w=1
Pr
[
Wˆ (k) 6= W ∣∣W = w] , (3)
and the leakage rate at the eavesdropper
1
n
I(W ; Y ne , h
L
e , h
L
1 , · · · , hLK , FL1 , · · · , FLK), (4)
where FLk is the sequence of feedback information sent by the k-th receiver during L fading
blocks, go to zero as n goes to infinity. Note that, we give to the eavesdropper all channels to
strengthen the secrecy results. The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the maximum achievable
secrecy rate, i.e., Cs , supRs, where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rates.
IMs case: When transmitting K independent messages to the legitimate receivers, each
intended for a particular user, a (2nR1, · · · , 2nRK , n) code consists of the following elements:
• K message sets Wk =
{
1, 2, · · ·, 2nRk}, k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, with the messages Wk ∈ Wk
independent and uniformly distributed;
• A stochastic encoder at the transmitter f :W1 × · · · ×WK → X n that maps each message
tuple (w1, · · · , wK) to a codeword xn ∈ X n;
• K decoders, one at each legitimate receiver, gk : Ynk → W1 × · · · × WK ,
k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, that maps a received sequence ynk ∈ Ynk to (wˆ1, · · · , wˆK) ∈ W1×· · ·×WK .
A rate tuple (R1,R2, · · · ,RK) is said to be achievable if there exists a code such that the
average error probability at each legitimate receiver,
Pek =
1
2nRk
2nRk∑
wk=1
Pr
[
Wˆk 6= Wk
∣∣Wk = wk] , (5)
and the leakage rate at the eavesdropper
1
n
I(W1, · · · ,WK ; Y ne , hLe , hL1 , · · · , hLK , FL1 , · · · , FLK), (6)
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where FLk is the sequence of feedback information sent by the k-th receiver during L fading
blocks, go to zero as n goes to infinity. The secrecy sum-rate is, then, given by R˜s =
K∑
k=1
Rk,
and the secrecy sum-capacity is defined, in this case, as C˜s , sup R˜s.
CCMs case: A (2nR0 , 2nR1, n) code for the broadcast channel with a common and a confi-
dential messages transmissions consists of the following elements:
• Two message sets: W0 =
{
1, 2, · · ·, 2nR0} and W1 = {1, 2, · · ·, 2nR1} with the messages
W0 ∈ W0 and W1 ∈ W1 independent and uniformly distributed over the corresponding sets;
• A stochastic encoder f : (W0,W1) → X n that maps each message pair (w0, w1) to a
codeword xn ∈ X n;
• A decoder at each Rk receiver, k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, gk : Ynk → (W0,W1) that maps a received
sequence ynk ∈ Ynk to a message pair (wˆ(k)0 , wˆ(k)1 ) ∈ (W0,W1);
• A decoder at the R/E receiver g : Yne → W0 that maps a received sequence yne ∈ Yne to a
message wˆ
(K+1)
0 ∈W0.
A rate pair (R0,R1) is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR0, 2nR1 , n) code such that
the average error probability at each receiver Rk,
Pek =
1
2nR0+nR1
2nR0∑
w0=1
2nR1∑
w1=1
Pr
[
(Wˆ
(k)
0 , Wˆ
(k)
1 ) 6= (W0,W1)
∣∣W0 = w0 and W1 = w1] , (7)
the average error probability at receiver R/E,
PeR/E =
1
2nR0
2nR0∑
w0=1
Pr
[
Wˆ
(K+1)
0 6= W0
∣∣W0 = w0] , (8)
and the leakage rate at receiver R/E, 1
n
I(W1; Y
n
e , h
L
e , h
L
1 , · · · , hLK , FL), go to zero as n goes to
infinity.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The aim of this work is to study and understand the effect of having a limited knowledge
of the CSIT on the ergodic secrecy throughput of multi-user broadcast wiretap channels. This
limitation in the knowledge of the CSIT is the downside of the realistic assumption that the
feedback links, used by the legitimate receivers to inform the transmitter about their CSI, have
finite capacity. In this section, we formulate the obtained results for the CM, the IMs, and the
CCMs’ transmission scenarios. In all cases, we show that as long as the transmitter has some
knowledge of the main CSI, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved.
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A. Broadcasting a Common Message
In this subsection, we examine the case when a unique confidential information is broadcasted
to all the legitimate receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Theorem 1. The ergodic common message secrecy capacity of the block-fading multi-user
broadcast wiretap channel with an error free b-bit CSI feedback sent by each legitimate receiver,
at the beginning of each fading block, is characterized as
C−s ≤ Cs ≤ C+s , (9)
where C−s and C+s are given by
C−s =min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (10)
C+s = min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=0
Q∑
q=0
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1] E
γe,γk
[{
log
(
1+γkPq
1+γePq
)}+∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γk<τq+1
]
, (11)
with Q=2b, {τq | 0=τ0<τ1< · · ·<τQ}Qq=1 are the reconstruction points describing the support of
γk with τQ+1=∞ for convenience, and {Pq}Qq=1 are the power transmission strategies satisfying
the average power constraint.
Proof: A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.
The main difference between the lower and the upper bounds in Theorem 1 is that the feedback
information is used to adapt both the transmission rate and the power for the achievable secrecy
rate while it is only used to adjust the transmission power for the upper bound. As a matter of fact,
the key point in the proof of achievability of (10) is that the feedback information is exploited
to fix the transmission rate during each coherence block. That is, if the legitimate receiver with
the weakest average SNR informs the transmitter that its channel gain falls within the interval
[τq, τq+1), q ∈ {1, · · ·, Q}, the transmitter conveys the codewords at rate Rq = log (1+τqPq) .
Rate Rq changes only periodically and is held constant over the duration interval of a fading
block. It may seem optimal to let the transmission rate vary with the actual value of the weakest
channel gain instead of fixing it with regards to the lower bound of the interval in which it lies.
However, in this case, we will lose the {.}+ inside the expectation, i.e., the eavesdropper can have
a better rate than the legitimate receivers in some fading blocks. The considered setup guarantees
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that when γe>τq , the mutual information between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is upper
bounded by Rq . Otherwise, this mutual information is equal to log (1+γePq).
It is also worth mentioning that, similarly to the case of multi-user common message trans-
mission with no secrecy constraints, the obtained secrecy bounds are limited by the legitimate
receiver with the lowest average SNR. It goes without saying that this limitation ensures that all
legitimate receivers are able to recover the transmitted message reliably. We can also see from
Theorem 1 that even with a 1-bit CSI feedback, sent by each legitimate receiver at the beginning
of each fading block, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved. Of course, as the number
of feedback bits increases, the secrecy throughput ameliorates, and when Q → ∞, our bounds
coincide, yielding the result presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The ergodic common message secrecy capacity of the block fading multi-user
broadcast wiretap channel with perfect main CSIT is given by
Cs = min
1≤k≤K
max
P (γk)
E
γk,γe
[{
log
(
1+γkP (γk)
1+γeP (γk)
)}+]
, (12)
with E[P (γk)] ≤ Pavg.
Proof: Corollary 1 results directly from the expressions of the achievable rate in (10) and
the upper bound in (11), by letting Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1] = 1/Q and taking into consideration that
as Q→∞, the set of reconstruction points, {τ1, · · ·, τQ}, becomes infinite and each legitimate
receiver Rk is basically forwarding γk to the transmitter. 
To the best of our knowledge, this result has not been reported in earlier works. For the special
case of single user transmission, the secrecy capacity in corollary 1 coincides with the result
in [5, Theorem 2].
Remark 1. The results presented in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are obtained for the case when
each legitimate receiver has its own CSI feedback link. The same results are valid when the
legitimate receivers share a unique feedback channel. In this case, the shared link should only
be used to send the feedback information associated with the legitimate receiver having the worst
average channel gain.
Remark 2. Even though the considered system model only assumes the presence of one eaves-
dropper, the extension to the multiple eavesdroppers’ case is straightforward. In fact, since
the distribution of the variable γe is not fixed, the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
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can also cover the case with multiple wiretappers. That is, in the event when multiple non-
colluding eavesdroppers conduct the attack, the distribution of γe should be that of the maximum,
i.e., γe = max1≤m≤M γem , where M is the total number of eavesdroppers, and γem = |hem |2, with
hem being the channel gain between the transmitter and the m
th eavesdropper. If the information
is secured against the eavesdropper with the best channel, it would also be secured against all
the other eavesdroppers. In the case when the wiretappers collude, the distribution of γe should
be substituted by that of
∑M
m=1 γem . The eavesdroppers could be seen, then, as a powerful
wiretapper with M antennas.
B. Broadcasting Independent Messages
Now, we consider the case when multiple independent messages are broadcasted to the
legitimate receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Theorem 2. The ergodic secrecy sum-capacity of the block-fading multi-user broadcast wiretap
channel with an error free b-bit CSI feedback sent by each legitimate receiver, at the beginning
of each fading block, is characterized as
C−s ≤ Cs ≤ C+s , (13)
where C−s and C+s are given by
C−s = max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γmax<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (14)
C+s = max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=0
Q∑
q=0
Pr [τq≤γmax<τq+1] E
γe,γmax
[{
log
(
1+γmaxPq
1+γePq
)}+ ∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γmax<τq+1
]
, (15)
with γmax= max
1≤k≤K
γk, Q=2
b, {τq |0=τ0<τ1< · · ·<τQ}Qq=1 are the reconstruction points describing
the support of γmax with τQ+1=∞ for convenience, and {Pq}Qq=1 are the power transmission
strategies satisfying the average power constraint.
Proof: A detailed proof of Theorem 2 is provided in Appendix B.
As for the common message case, the main difference between the bounds in Theorem 2
is that the feedback information is used to adapt both the transmission rate and the power for
the achievable secrecy sum-rate and only the power in the upper bound. The secrecy sum-rate
is achieved by transmitting only to the legitimate user with the best quantized CSI, in a given
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fading block. Under this strategy, the multi-user broadcast channel reduces to a point-to-point
communication with the channel gain distributed as max1≤k≤K γk. One can think that encoding
only for the strongest receiver is not valid to establish the secrecy sum-capacity. However, if we
look for instance at the two users case, we can easily show that I(X ; Y1|U)+I(U ; Y2)=I(X ; Y1),
and hence that R1+R2≤I(X ; Y1), with the first receiver being always the strongest one and
U→X→Y1→Y2 forming a Markov chain. The proposed achievability scheme has then a time
sharing interpretation to it and even if the result is given in terms of the secrecy sum-rate, the
secrecy rate Rk of each legitimate receiver, k ∈ {1, · · ·, K}, can also be characterized. Indeed,
we can write Rk ≤ C−s × Pr[user k is the strongest receiver].
The result in Theorem 2 shows also that even with a 1-bit CSI feedback, sent by each legitimate
receiver at the beginning of each fading block, a non-zero secrecy sum-rate can still be achieved.
Of course, as the number of feedback bits increases, the secrecy sum-throughput ameliorates,
and when Q → ∞, the bounds on the secrecy sum-capacity coincide, yielding the expression
presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The ergodic secrecy sum-capacity of a block fading multi-user broadcast wiretap
channel, with perfect main CSIT, is given by
Cs = max
P (γmax)
E
γmax,γe
[{
log
(
1+γmaxP (γmax)
1+γeP (γmax)
)}+]
, (16)
with γmax=max1≤k≤K γk, and E[P (γmax)] ≤ Pavg.
Proof: Corollary 2 results directly from Theorem 2 by letting Q→∞ and following a similar
reasoning as for the proof of Corollary 1. 
Remark 3. The results presented in Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 consider the case when each
legitimate receiver has its own CSI feedback link. The same results are valid when the legitimate
receivers share a unique feedback channel. In this case, the shared link should be used to send
the feedback information associated with the legitimate receiver having the best channel gain at
a given fading block.
Remark 4. As for the CM case, the results in Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 can be easily extended
to the multiple eavesdroppers’ case by adopting the same changes outlined in Remark 2.
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Remark 5. In both the CM case and the IMs case, we assume that the CSI feedback link is
error-free. In the event when the feedback information is erased or erroneous, the obtained
secrecy rates should be multiplied by the probability of no erasure or the probability of no
error, respectively. Note, however, that in this case, the transmitter can opt to omit the CSI
feedback when the impact of erasure or error is high. The secret transmission is, then, based
on the knowledge of the channel distributions only. This means that we lose the {.}+ inside the
expectations.
To better understand this scenario, let us give an example for the MIs case. Assuming
that Pre is the probability of erasure or error, the achievable secrecy rate in this case is
max
(
Rs;Pre × C−s
)
, where C−s is given in Theorem 2, and
Rs = max
1≤k≤K
{
E
γe,γk
[
log
(
1+γkPt
1+γePt
)]}+
,
with Pt being a fixed transmission power.
C. Broadcasting Common and Confidential Messages
In this subsection, we present the ergodic secrecy capacity region of the block-fading BCCM
with finite CSI feedback. First, we consider the case of the error-free feedback link. Then, we
characterize the achievable secrecy rate region when the feedback link is a BEC.
We should note that, for this transmission scenario, we focus on the case when the system
users are cooperating, and the feedback information is sent over a shared CSI feedback link,
cf. Fig. 2(c). This particular model allows better use of the feedback information to achieve the
secrecy capacity. We will also explain how the obtained results change when each user has its
own CSI feedback link.
1) Feedback Sent Over an Error-Free Link: Let us first start with the case when only one
bit of CSI feedback could be sent. This one bit of feedback will be exploited to indicate to
the transmitter whether the channel to R/E is better than that to the legitimate receivers, i.e.,
the feedback is equal to one when min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe, and equal to zero otherwise. This
particular use of the feedback allows us to achieve the secrecy capacity of the system, presented
in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3. The ergodic secrecy capacity region of the block-fading BCCM with a 1-bit CSI
feedback, sent at the beginning of each coherence block over an error-free link, is given by
Cs =
⋃
(p01,p02,p1)∈P
(R0,R1) :
R0 ≤ min
1≤k≤K+1
{
E
γk
[
log
(
1+
p01γk
1+p1γk
) ∣∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A] + E
γk
[
log (1+p02γk)
∣∣γ∈Ac]Pr[γ∈Ac]}
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
γk ,γe
[
log (1+p1γk)− log (1+p1γe)
∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A],
(17)
where γK+1 = γe, γ = [γ1 · · · γK γe], A =
{
γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe
}
and
P = {(p01, p02, p1) : (p01+p1) Pr[γ∈A]+p02 Pr[γ∈Ac]≤Pavg} .
Proof: A detailed proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Appendix C.
We can see, from Theorem 3, that the common message W0 is sent over all coherence
blocks while the confidential message W1 is transmitted only over the fading blocks where
the instantaneous channel gain of R/E is worst than the average channel gains of the other
receivers, i.e., γ ∈ A={γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe}. That is, when γ ∈ A, all receivers decode
the common message considering the secure message as noise, whereas when γ ∈ Ac, since
the confidential message is not sent, the common message is decoded at a single user rate.
The minimization is due to a bottleneck argument. Also, Theorem 3 states that even with a
1-bit CSI feedback sent at the beginning of each fading block, and as long as event A is not a
zero-probability event, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved.
At the difference of the perfect CSIT case [6], the power cannot be instantaneously adapted to
the channel realizations and will only depend on the received 1-bit CSI feedback according to a
deterministic mapping. It is worth mentioning that p01 and p02 in Theorem 3 correspond to the
power allocated to common message transmissions in A and Ac, respectively, whereas p1 is the
power allocated to the confidential message. When the feedback link has a larger capacity, i.e.,
more feedback bits can be sent, one bit should be used as an indication bit to point out which
channel is better, as explained in the proof of Theorem 3, while the remaining bits should be
used to adapt the transmission power. The resulting secrecy capacity is given in the following
corollary.
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Corollary 3. The secrecy capacity region of the block-fading BCCM with a b-bit CSI feedback,
sent at the beginning of each coherence block over an error-free link, is given by
Cs =
⋃
{Hq}
Q
q=1
(p01q ,p02q ,p1q )∈P

(R0,R1) :
R0 ≤ min
1≤k≤K+1
{
Q∑
q=1
E
γk
[
log
(
1+
p01qγk
1+p1qγk
)∣∣∣γ∈A∩Hq]Pr[γ∈A∩Hq]
+E
γk
[
log
(
1+p02qγk
) ∣∣γ∈Ac∩Hq] Pr[γ∈Ac∩Hq]
}
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
Q∑
q=1
E
γk,γe
[
log
(
1+p1qγk
1+p1qγe
) ∣∣∣γ∈A∩Hq]Pr[γ∈A∩Hq],
(18)
where γK+1 = γe, Q = 2
b−1, γ = [γ1 · · · γK γe], {Hq}Qq=1 are the partition regions representing
the space of γ, A = {γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe} and
P =
{
(p01q , p02q , p1q) :
Q∑
q=1
(p01q+p1q) Pr[γ∈A∩Hq]+p02q Pr[γ∈Ac∩Hq]≤Pavg
}
.
Proof: The proof of Corollary 3 follows along similar lines as the proof of Theorem 1 by
using one bit of feedback to indicate which channel is better and exploiting the remaining b−1
bits to adapt the transmission power.
In this case, it is worth mentioning that the space of the channel gain vector γ is partitioned into
Q regions. During each fading block, the index of the partition region where γ lies is fed back to
the transmitter along with the indication bit. Furthermore, each partition index q corresponds to
a transmission power profile p01q and p1q to transmit the common and the confidential messages
when γ ∈ A and p02q to transmit the common message solely when γ ∈ Ac, with p01q , p02q
and p1q satisfying the average power constraint. The codebooks for the partition regions and
the corresponding transmission power profiles should be known to all terminals. Also, it should
be emphasized that when the feedback link has an infinite capacity, i.e., Q → ∞, the secrecy
capacity region in Corollary 1 coincides with the perfect CSIT result in [6].
2) Feedback Sent Over a BEC:
Corollary 4. An achievable secrecy rate region of the block-fading BCCM with a 1-bit CSI
feedback, sent at the beginning of each coherence block over a BEC with erasure probability ǫ,
19
is given by
Rs =
⋃
(p01,p02,p1)∈P

(R0,R1) :
R0 ≤ min
1≤k≤K+1
{
E
γk
[
log
(
1+
p01γk
1+p1γk
)∣∣∣E c & γ∈A](1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈A]
+E
γk
[
log (1+p02γk)
∣∣E or (E c & γ∈Ac)] (ǫ+(1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈Ac])}
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
γk,γe
[
log
(
1+p1γk
1+p1γe
) ∣∣∣E c & γ∈A] (1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈A],
(19)
where γK+1 = γe, γ = [γ1 · · · γK γe], A =
{
γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe
}
, E represents the era-
sure event, and P = {(p01, p02, p1) : (p01+p1)(1−ǫ) Pr[γ∈A]+p02 (ǫ+(1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈Ac])≤Pavg} .
Proof: The achievability proof is provided in Appendix D. We note that the conditioning on
events E and E c is inactive when the erasures are independent of the forward channel gains.
When the 1-bit feedback is sent over a BEC, the transmission of the confidential message W1
is restricted to the coherence blocks where min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe and the feedback information
is not erased. The common message W0 is sent over all fading blocks. It is clear that the
confidential rate R1 reduces as the erasure probability increases and vanishes when the erasure
event is a sure event, i.e., the transmitter has no knowledge about the CSI. However, as long as
ǫ 6= 1 and event A is not a zero-probability event, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved.
In the previous subsection, we did see that when more than one bit of feedback is sent over
an error-free link, one bit is used as an indication bit while the remaining extra bits are used
to adapt the transmission power. Now, in the case when the feedback bits are sent over a BEC,
it would be more interesting to use the extra bits as redundant indication bits. By doing so,
the probability of receiving a non-erased indication bit will increase, and this will eventually
increase the probability of transmitting the secret information. The secrecy rate region is given
in this case in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. An achievable secrecy rate region of the block-fading BCCM with a b-bit CSI
feedback, sent at the beginning of each coherence block over a BEC with erasure probability ǫ,
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is given by
Rs =
⋃
(p01,p02,p1)∈P

(R0,R1) :
R0 ≤ min
1≤k≤K+1
{
E
γk
[
log
(
1+
p01γk
1+p1γk
)∣∣∣E cb−bit & γ∈A](1−ǫb)Pr[γ∈A]
+E
γk
[
log (1+p02γk)
∣∣Eb−bit or (E cb−bit & γ∈Ac)] (ǫb+(1−ǫb)Pr[γ∈Ac])}
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
γk,γe
[
log
(
1+p1γk
1+p1γe
) ∣∣∣E cb−bit & γ∈A] (1−ǫb)Pr[γ∈A],
(20)
where γK+1 = γe, γ = [γ1 · · · γK γe], A =
{
γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe
}
, Eb−bit represents the
event when all b feedback bits are erased, and
P = {(p01, p02, p1) : (p01+p1)(1−ǫb) Pr[γ∈A]+p02 (ǫb+(1−ǫb)Pr[γ∈Ac])≤Pavg} .
Proof: The proof of Corollary 5 follows along similar lines as the proof of Corollary 4 by
using b redundant bits of feedback to indicate which channel is better. Here again, we note that
the conditioning on events Eb−bit and E
c
b−bit is inactive when the erasures are independent of the
forward channel gains.
From Corollary 5 we can see that the probability of transmitting the secret information depends
on the erasure event Eb−bit, and is equal to (1−ǫb)Pr[γ∈A]. That is, as long as event A is
not a zero-probability event, increasing the number of redundant indication bits b increases the
probability of transmitting the secret message. This is particularly interesting when the probability
of erasure ǫ is high. Another interesting approach to exploit the b feedback bits in this case would
be to use i out of b feedback bits as redundant indication bits and the remaining b−i bits to
adapt the power. The transmission of the secret message would be conditioned, in this case, by
having at least one non-erased bit out of the i redundant bits. Also, in this case, choosing the
adequate region to adapt the power would require all b−i bits used for power adaptation to be
non-erased.
Remark 6. As stated at the beginning of this subsection, the obtained results for the BCCM
consider the case when a unique feedback link is shared to send the channel information. When
each receiver has its own independent feedback link, the capacity in Theorem 3 and Corollary 3
cannot be achieved. Each receiver will use its feedback link to indicate to the transmitter
in which interval its channel gain lies. The transmitter will still be able to decide whether
21
min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe, or not, when R/E and the legitimate receiver with the weakest channel
indicate different intervals. When these intervals are the same, the transmitter cannot conclude
which channel is better, and only the common message will be transmitted over those fad-
ing blocks.
Remark 7. In the event when there are multiple R/E, let us say M of them, message W0 will be
sent to all K+M system users while message W1 will only be sent to the K legitimate receivers,
and has to be kept secret from the R/Es. In this case, the indication bit should be used to compare
min1≤k≤K E [γk] to γe = max1≤m≤M γem for the non-colluding scenario, and to γe =
∑M
m=1 γem
for the colluding one. By adapting the distribution of γe, as explained in Remark 2, the results
for the BCCM can be extended to the multi-R/E case.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS AT HIGH-SNR
In this section, we provide an asymptotic study of the obtained ergodic secrecy rates and
secrecy rate regions presented in the previous section.
A. Broadcasting a Comman Message
Corollary 6. In the high-SNR regime, the ergodic common message secrecy capacity of the
block-fading multi-user broadcast wiretap channel with an error free b-bit CSI feedback sent by
each legitimate receiver, at the beginning of each fading block, is characterized as
C−H-SNR ≤ Cs-HSNR ≤ C+H-SNR, (21)
where C−H-SNR and C+H-SNR are given by
C−H-SNR= min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
τq
γe
)}+]
, (22)
C+H-SNR= min
1≤k≤K
E
γe,γk
[{
log
(
γk
γe
)}+]
, (23)
with Q=2b, and {τq |0=τ0<τ1< · · ·<τQ}Qq=1 are the reconstruction points describing the support
of γk with τQ+1=∞ for convenience.
Proof: The result in Corollary 6 can be deduced directly from Theorem 1 by taking the limits
of C−s and C+s when Pavg →∞.
The obtained result in Corollary 6 shows that the secrecy capacity is bounded at high SNR, i.e., it
does not depend on Pavg.
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B. Broadcasting Independent Messages
1) Lower and Upper Bounds:
Corollary 7. In the high-SNR regime, the ergodic secrecy sum-capacity of the block-fading multi-
user broadcast wiretap channel with an error free b-bit CSI feedback sent by each legitimate
receiver, at the beginning of each fading block, is characterized as
C−H-SNR ≤ Cs-HSNR ≤ C+H-SNR, (24)
where C−H-SNR and C+H-SNR are given by
C−H-SNR= max
{τq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γmax<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
τq
γe
)}+]
, (25)
C+H-SNR= E
γe,γmax
[{
log
(
γmax
γe
)}+]
, (26)
with γmax= max
1≤k≤K
γk, Q=2
b, and {τq | 0=τ0<τ1< · · ·<τQ}Qq=1 are the reconstruction points
describing the support of γmax with τQ+1=∞ for convenience.
Proof: The result in Corollary 7 can be deduced directly from Theorem 2 by taking the limits
of C−s and C+s when Pavg →∞.
As for the common message case, we can see that the secrecy sum-capacity does not depend
on Pavg at the high-SNR regime. However, since the obtained expressions are in terms of γmax,
the secrecy performance scales with the number of legitimate receivers K.
2) Scaling Law:
Corollary 8. The secrecy sum-capacity when broadcasting independent messages to a large
number of legitimate receivers, i.e., K → ∞, over Rayleigh fading channels with an infinite
average power constraint, i.e., Pavg →∞, scales as log logK.
Proof: On one hand, we have
lim
K→∞
Cs-HSNR ≥ lim
K→∞
C−H-SNR (27)
≥ lim
K→∞
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γmax<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
τq
γe
)}+]
(28)
≥ lim
K→∞
Pr [τQ≤γmax]E
γe
[{
log
(
τQ
γe
)}+]
. (29)
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Then, taking τQ = logK, we can write
lim
K→∞
Cs-HSNR ≥ lim
K→∞
Pr [logK≤γmax]E
γe
[{
log
(
logK
γe
)}+]
. (30)
Considering Rayleigh fading channels, the distribution of the maximum fγmax(γmax) converges
toward δ(γmax− logK) as K→∞, with δ(.) being the Dirac-Delta function. It is, then, almost
sure that γmax = logK, and that Pr [logK≤γmax] = 1 as K→∞. Hence, we have
lim
K→∞
Cs-HSNR ≥ lim
K→∞
E
γe
[{
log
(
logK
γe
)}+]
. (31)
Since the variable γe does not depend on K, the term E
γe
[log (γe)] is asymptotically dominated
by log logK, i.e., E
γe
[log (γe)] =o(log logK), yielding
lim
K→∞
(Cs-HSNR− log logK) ≥ 0. (32)
On the other hand, we have
lim
K→∞
Cs-HSNR ≤ lim
K→∞
C+H-SNR (33)
= E
γe,γmax
[{
log
(
γmax
γe
)}+]
. (34)
Once again, considering the fact that fγmax(γmax)→ δ(γmax− logK) and E
γe
[log (γe)] =o(log logK)
as K→∞, we get limK→∞ (Cs-HSNR− log logK) ≤ 0. 
C. Broadcasting Common and Confidential Messages
1) Feedback Sent Over an Error-Free Link:
Corollary 9. In the high-SNR regime, the ergodic secrecy capacity region of the block-fading
BCCM with a 1-bit CSI feedback, sent at the beginning of each coherence block over an error-free
link, is given by
CH-SNR =
⋃
(α01,α02,α1)∈Φ

(R0−HSNR,R1−HSNR) :
R0−HSNR ≤ log
(
1+
α01
α1
)
Pr[γ∈A] + (logPavg) Pr[γ∈Ac]
R1−HSNR ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
γk,γe
[
log
(
γk
γe
)∣∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A],
(35)
where A = {γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe} and
Φ=
{
(α01, α02, α1) : (α01+α1) Pr[γ∈A]+α02 Pr[γ∈Ac]≤1
}
.
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Proof: Considering the secrecy capacity region in Theorem 3 with p01=α01Pavg, p02=α02Pavg,
and p1=α1Pavg, such that (α01+α1) Pr[γ∈A]+α02 Pr[γ∈Ac]≤1, we can write
R0 ≤ min
1≤k≤K+1
{
E
γk
[
log
(
1+
α01Pavgγk
1+α1Pavgγk
) ∣∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A]
+E
γk
[
log (1+α02Pavgγk)
∣∣γ∈Ac] Pr[γ∈Ac]} , (36)
and R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
γk,γe
[
log (1+α1Pavgγk)− log (1+α1Pavgγe)
∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A]. (37)
Without loss of generality, we assume that α01, α02, and α1 are non-zero power splitting factors.
Taking the limit of R0 and R1 when Pavg goes to ∞, we get
lim
Pavg→∞
R0
≤ lim
Pavg→∞
E
[
log
(
1+
α01
α1
) ∣∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A]
+
(
logPavg+ min
1≤k≤K+1
E
γk
[
log (α02γk)
∣∣γ∈Ac])Pr[γ∈Ac] (38)
= lim
Pavg→∞
log
(
1+
α01
α1
)
Pr[γ∈A]+ logPavg Pr[γ∈Ac], (39)
and
lim
Pavg→∞
R1 ≤ lim
Pavg→∞
min
1≤k≤K
E
γk ,γe
[
log
(
1+α1Pavgγk
1+α1Pavgγe
) ∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A] (40)
= lim
Pavg→∞
min
1≤k≤K
E
γk,γe
[
log
(
γk
γe
) ∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A]. (41)
The particular cases when α01, α02, or α1 are equal to zero, can be deduced similarly, and are
included in the asymptotic capacity region in Corollary 9. 
2) Feedback Sent Over a BEC:
Corollary 10. In the high-SNR regime, the achievable secrecy rate region of the block-fading
BCCM with a 1-bit CSI feedback, sent at the beginning of each coherence block over a BEC
with erasure probability ǫ, is given by
RH-SNR =
⋃
(α01,α02,α1)∈Φ

(R0−HSNR,R1−HSNR) :
R0−HSNR ≤ log
(
1+
α01
α1
)
(1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈A] + (logPavg)
(
ǫ+(1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈Ac])
R1−HSNR ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
γk,γe
[
log
(
γk
γe
) ∣∣∣E c & γ∈A] (1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈A],
(42)
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where E represents the erasure event, A = {γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe} and
Φ=
{
(α01, α02, α1) : (α01+α1)(1−ǫ) Pr[γ∈A]+α02
(
ǫ+(1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈Ac])≤1} .
Proof: The proof follows similar lines as the proof of Corollary 9.
We note that in the case when b bits of feedback are sent over an error-free link, the asymptotic
behavior is the same as in Corollary 9. This is because only one bit is used as an indication
bit while the remaining bits are used to adapt the power. Power adaptation is useless at high-
SNR and in this regime, we only need the 1-bit indication feedback. In the case of a BEC
with b feedback bits, the asymptotic secrecy rate region can be deduced from Corollary 10
by substituting the erasure probability ǫ by ǫb. This is obtained by using all feedback bits as
redundant indication bits.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide selected simulation results for the case of independent and iden-
tically distributed Rayleigh fading channels. We consider that the system’s variables, the main
channel gains hk, k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, and the eavesdropper’s channel gain he, are all drawn from
the zero-mean, unit-variance complex Gaussian distribution.
Figure 3 illustrates the common message achievable secrecy rate C−s , presented in Theorem 1,
with K=3 and various b-bit feedback, b=1, 2, 4. The secrecy capacity Cs, from Corollary 1,
is also presented as a benchmark. It represents the secrecy capacity with full main CSI at the
transmitter. We can see that as the capacity of the feedback link grows, i.e., the number of bits b
increases, the achievable rate grows toward the secrecy capacity Cs. The asymptotic expressions
in Corollary 6 are also illustrated and show the boundedness of the secrecy throughput at high-
SNR. The same observations can be made for the independent messages case; illustrated in
figure 4. Two scenarios are considered here; the transmission of three independent messages to
three legitimate receivers, K=3, and the transmission of ten independent messages with K=10.
Both the achievable secrecy sum-rate in Theorem 2 and the secrecy sum-capacity in Corollary 2
are depicted. The impact of changing the number of legitimate receivers K on the secrecy sum-
rate is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 for different values of the average power constraint Pavg and
of the number of feedback bits b. We can see from these two figures that the secrecy throughput
of the system, when broadcasting multiple messages, increases with K.
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Fig. 3: Common message secrecy rate in Theorem 1 for Rayleigh fading channels with K=3.
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Fig. 4: Independent messages secrecy sum-rate in Theorem 2 for Rayleigh fading channels with
b=4.
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Figure 7 illustrates the secrecy capacity region for the BCCM with a 1-bit CSI feedback sent
over an error-free link, presented in Theorem 3. In this figure, we take K=1, h1∼CN (0, 1),
he∼CN (0, σ2e ), and Pavg=5 dB. The boundary of the secrecy capacity region when perfect CSI
is available at the transmitter is also presented as a benchmark. We can see that even with a
1-bit CSI feedback, a positive secrecy rate is achieved, and that when the channel to receiver R1
is better than the channel to receiver R/E, i.e., when σ2e=0.5, the confidential rate R1 improves
while the common rate R0 decreases.
The impact of having a binary erasure feedback link, on the achievable secrecy rate region,
is illustrated in Figure 8, along with the boundaries on the secrecy capacity regions for the
error-free feedback case and the perfect CSIT case, with K=1, h1∼CN (0, 1), he∼CN (0, 1),
Pavg=5 dB, and different values of the erasure probability ǫ=0.2, 0.5, and 0.8. As expected, we
can see that the confidential rate R1 decreases as the probability of erasure increases since the
transmission of the confidential message will be restricted, not only by the channel quality but
also by the reception of a not erased feedback. The transmission of the common message solely
is not affected by the erasure of the feedback information. Besides, we can see from Figure 9
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that when the erasure probability is high, i.e., ǫ=0.8, the confidential rate does not improve much
even when we increase the average power constraint from Pavg=5 dB to Pavg=20 dB. Moreover,
from Figure 10, we can see that the secrecy rate can be significantly improved by using more
redundant feedback bits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Knowing the CSIT in a wiretap communication system is critical since the core idea behind
information theoretic security is to exploit the randomness of the channel variations to achieve
secrecy at the physical layer. In this work, we studied the impact of having an uncertain CSIT,
obtained through a finite-rate feedback link, on the secrecy throughput of multi-user broadcast
wiretap channels. We considered the cases of common message transmission, independent mes-
sages transmission, and the broadcast channel with confidential messages. The obtained results,
in all three cases, show that even with a 1-bit CSI feedback, a positive secrecy rate can still
be achieved. It goes without saying that the more the transmitter knows, the better the secrecy
throughput is.
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Among the open challenges that could be considered as an extension of this work, one can
examine the case when no assumption on the adversary’s CSI is imposed, i.e., when even
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the statistics of the wiretapper’s channel are not available at the transmitter. An interesting
approach, in this case, could be found in the framework of arbitrary varying eavesdropper channel.
Designing practical codes for fading wiretap channels is another open issue facing information
theoretic security either with perfect or uncertain CSIT.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this appendix, we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 1. We start with the proof of
achievability for the ergodic common message secrecy rate (10) followed by the proof of the
upper bound (11). We recall that, in this scenario, each legitimate receiver uses a b-bit feedback
link to inform the transmitter about its CSI, and that all the legitimate receivers are interested
in the same common secure information.
A. Proof of Achievability
Since the transmission is controlled by the feedback information, we consider that, during each
fading block, if the main channel gain of the receiver with the weakest average channel gain
falls within the interval [τq, τq+1), q ∈ {1, · · ·, Q}, the transmitter conveys the codewords at rate
Rq = log (1+τqPq) . Rate Rq changes only periodically and is held constant over the duration
interval of a fading block. Besides, we adopt a probabilistic transmission model where the
communication is constrained by the quality of the legitimate channels. Given the reconstruction
points, τ1< · · ·<τQ<τQ+1=∞, describing the support of each channel gain γk, k ∈ {1, · · · , K},
and since the channel gains of the K receivers are independent, there are M=QK different states
for the received feedback information. Each of these states, Jm, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, represents
one subchannel. The transmission scheme consists on transmitting an independent codeword, on
each of the M subchannels, with a fixed rate. We define the following rates
R−s = min
1≤k≤K
M∑
m=1
Pr [Jm]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τk,mPm
1+γePm
)}+]
, (43)
and Re,m = E
γe
[log (1+γePm)] , where τk,m is the quantized channel gain corresponding to the
receiver with the weakest average SNR in state Jm and Pm is the associated power policy
satisfying the average power constraint.
Codebook Generation: We construct M independent codebooks C1, · · · , CM , one for each
subchannel, constructed similarly to the standard wiretap codes. Each codebook Cm is a (n, 2nR−s )
code with 2n(R
−
s +Re,m) codewords randomly partitioned into 2nR
−
s bins.
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Encoding and Decoding: Given a particular common message w∈{1, 2, · · ·, 2nR−s }, to be
transmitted, the encoder selects M codewords, one for each subchannel. More specifically, if the
message to be sent is w, then for each subchannel m, the encoder randomly selects one of the
codewords Unm from the wth bin in Cm. During each fading block, of length κ, the transmitter
experiences one of the events Jm. Depending on the encountered channel state, the transmitter
broadcasts κRq information bits of Unm using a Gaussian codebook. By the weak law of large
numbers, when the total number of fading blocks L is large, the entire binary sequences are
transmitted with high probability. To decode, each legitimate receiver considers the observations
corresponding to all M subchannels. And since the transmission is adapted with regard to the
receiver with the weakest average SNR, all legitimate receivers can recover the transmitted
codewords, with high probability, and hence recover message w. Details on the error probability
evaluation are similar to the parallel channels case [7]. Since τk,m ∈ {τ1, · · ·, τQ}, by rewriting
the summation over the states of each legitimate receiver, the expression of R−s can then be
reformulated as
R−s =min
1≤k≤K
M∑
m=1
Pr [Jm]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τk,mPm
1+γePm
)}+]
(44)
=min
1≤k≤K
M∑
m=1
Q∑
q=1
Pr [Jm, τk,m=τq]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
(45)
=min
1≤k≤K
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (46)
where (45) is obtained by noting that τk,m ∈ {τ1, · · ·, τQ} and applying the total probability
theorem, and (46) comes from the fact that
M∑
m=1
Pr [Jm, τk,m=τq] = Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1] .
Since each user gets to know the feedback information of the other legitimate receivers,
our proof is also valid when the reconstruction points {τq}Qq=1 and the transmission strategies
{Pq}Qq=1, associated with each legitimate receiver, are different. That is, we can choose these
quantization parameters to satisfy (10).
Secrecy Analysis: We need to prove that the equivocation rate satisfies Re ≥ R−s − ǫ.
Let ΓL=
{
γL1 , γ
L
2 , · · ·, γLK
}
and FL=
{
FL1 , F
L
2 , · · ·, FLK
}
, with Fk(l) ∈ {τ1, · · ·, τQ} being the
feedback information sent by receiver k in the l-th fading block. We have
nRe = H(W |Y ne , γLe ,ΓL, FL) (47)
33
≥ I(W ;Xn|Y ne , γLe ,ΓL, FL) (48)
= H(Xn|Y ne ,γLe ,ΓL,FL)−H(Xn|Y ne ,γLe ,ΓL,FL,W ). (49)
On one hand, we can write
H(Xn|Y ne , γLe ,ΓL, FL) =
L∑
l=1
H(Xκ(l)|Y κe (l),γe(l),γ1(l),· · ·,γK(l),FL1 ,· · ·,FLK) (50)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
H(X(l, j)|Y κe (l),γe(l),γ1(l),· · ·,γK(l),FL1 ,· · ·,FLK) (51)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
H(X(l, j)|γe(l),γ1(l),· · ·,γK(l),FL1 ,· · ·,FLK)
− I(X(l, j); Y κe (l)|γe(l),γ1(l),· · ·,γK(l),FL1 ,· · ·,FLK) (52)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
H(X(l, j)|F1(l),· · ·,FK(l))−I(X(l, j); Y κe (l)|γe(l),F1(l),· · ·,FK(l)) (53)
≥
∑
l∈DL
κ∑
j=1
H(X(l, j)|F1(l),· · ·,FK(l))−I(X(l, j); Y κe (l)|γe(l),F1(l),· · ·,FK(l)), (54)
where (50) results from the memoryless property of the channel and the independence of the
Xκ(l)’s, (53) comes from the adopted transmission scheme, where the signal transmitted during
a given fading block only depends on the feedback information sent during that block, and (54)
is obtained by removing all the terms corresponding to the fading blocks l 6∈ DL, with DL =
∪k∈{1,···,K} {l ∈ {1, · · ·, L} : Fk(l) > he(l)}.
Now, taking into account the adopted coding and transmission schemes, presented in details
at the beginning of this subsection, we have
H(X(l, j)|F1(l),· · ·,FK(l)) =
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1]H(X(l, j)|Fk∗(l) = q) (55)
=
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1]Rq, (56)
with k∗ being the index of the legitimate receiver with the worst average channel gain, and
I(X(l, j); Y κe (l)|γe(l),F1(l),· · ·,FK(l))
=
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1] I(X(l, j); Y κe (l)|γe(l),Fk∗(l) = q) (57)
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=
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1] log (1+γe(l)Pq) (58)
Substituting (55) and (57) in (54), we get
H(Xn|Y ne , γLe ,ΓL, FL) ≥
∑
l∈DL
κ∑
j=1
(
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1] (Rq− log (1+γe(l)Pq))−ǫ′
)
(59)
=
∑
l∈DL
κ
(
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1] (Rq− log (1+γe(l)Pq))−ǫ′
)
(60)
=κ
L∑
l=1
(
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1]{Rq−log(1+γe(l)Pq)}+−ǫ′
)
(61)
= n
Q∑
q=1
Pr [τq≤γk∗(l)<τq+1]E
γe
[{Rq− log (1+γePq)}+]− nǫ′ (62)
= nR−s − nǫ′, (63)
where (62) follows from the ergodicity of the channel as L→∞.
On the other hand, using a list decoding argument at the eavesdropper side and applying
Fano’s inequality [5], 1
n
H(Xn|Y ne , γLe ,ΓL, FL,W ) vanishes as n→∞ and we can write
H(Xn|Y ne , γLe ,ΓL, FL,W ) ≤ nǫ′′. (64)
Substituting (63) and (64) in (49), we get Re ≥ R−s − ǫ, with ǫ = ǫ′ + ǫ′′, and ǫ′ and ǫ′′ are
selected to be arbitrarily small. This concludes the proof. 
B. Proof of the Upper Bound
To establish the upper bound on the common message secrecy capacity in (11), we start by
supposing that the transmitter sends message w to only one legitimate receiver Rk. Using the
result in [27], for single user transmission with limited CSI feedback, the secrecy capacity of
our system can be upper bounded as
Cs≤ max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=0
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1] E
γe,γk
[{
log
(
1+γkPq
1+γePq
)}+∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γk<τq+1
]
. (65)
Since the choice of the receiver to transmit to is arbitrary, we tighten this upper bound by
choosing the legitimate receiver Rk that minimizes this quantity, yielding
C+s = min
1≤k≤K
max
{τq ;Pq}
Q
q=1
Q∑
q=0
Pr [τq≤γk<τq+1] E
γe,γk
[{
log
(
1+γkPq
1+γePq
)}+∣∣∣∣∣τq≤γk<τq+1
]
. (66)
This concludes the proof. 
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Here we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 2. We start with the proof of achievability for
the ergodic secrecy sum-rate (14) followed by the proof of the upper bound (15). In this case,
each legitimate receiver is interested in a different independent message, and all messages need
to be kept secret from the eavesdropper.
A. Proof of Achievability
The lower bound on the secrecy sum-capacity, presented in (14), is achieved using a time
division multiplexing scheme that selects periodically one receiver to transmit to. More specif-
ically, we consider that, during each fading block, the source only transmits to the legitimate
receiver with the highest τq, and if there are more than one, we choose one of them randomly.
Since we are transmitting to only one legitimate receiver at a time, the achieving coding scheme
consists on using independent standard single user Gaussian wiretap codebooks.
During each fading block, the transmitter receives K feedback information about the CSI
of the legitimate receivers. Since the channel gains of the K receivers are independent, there
are M=QK different states for the received feedback information, as discussed in the proof of
achievability of Theorem 1. Each of these states, Jm;m∈{1, · · · ,M}, represents one subchannel.
On each subchannel, the rate is fixed and the transmission is intended for the receiver with the
highest τq. The average is, then, taken over all possible subchannels. Let τ
max
m be the maximum
received feedback information on channel m. The achievable secrecy sum-rate can be written as
R−s =
M∑
m=1
Pr[Jm]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τmaxm P (τ
max
m )
1+γeP (τmaxm )
)}+]
(67)
=
Q∑
q=1
Pr[τq≤γmax<τq+1]E
γe
[{
log
(
1+τqPq
1+γePq
)}+]
, (68)
where (67) is obtained by using a Gaussian codebook with power P (τmaxm ), satisfying the
average power constraint, on each subchannel m [5], and (68) follows by using the fact that
τmaxm ∈{τ1, · · · , τQ} and rewriting the summation over these indices. Also, we note that the proba-
bility of adapting the transmission with τq corresponds to the probability of having τq≤γmax<τq+1,
with γmax=max1≤k≤K γk. Maximizing over the main channel gain reconstruction points τq and
the associated power transmission strategies Pq, concludes the proof. 
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B. Proof of the Upper Bound
To prove that C+s is an upper bound on the secrecy sum-capacity, we consider a new genie-aided
channel whose capacity upper bounds the capacity of the K-receivers channel with limited CSI
feedback. The new channel has only one receiver that observes the output of the strongest main
channel. The output signal of the genie-aided receiver is given by Ymax(t)=hmax(t)X(t)+v(t), at
time instant t, with hmax being the channel gain of the best legitimate channel, i.e., |hmax|2=γmax
and γmax=max1≤k≤K γk. The new channel can then be modeled as
Ymax(t) = hmax(t)X(t) + v(t)
Ye(t) = he(t)X(t) + we(t)
, t = 1, · · · , n. (69)
Let τq be the feedback information sent by the new receiver to the transmitter about its channel
gain, i.e., τq is fed back when τq≤γmax<τq+1. First, we need to prove that the secrecy capacity
of this new channel upper bounds the secrecy sum-capacity of the K-receivers channel with
limited CSI. To this end, it is sufficient to show that if a secrecy rate point (R1,R2, · · ·,RK)
is achievable on the K-receivers channel with limited CSI feedback, then, a secrecy sum-rate∑Rk is achievable on the new channel.
Let (W1,W2,· · ·,WK) be the independent transmitted messages corresponding to the rates
(R1,R2,· · ·,RK), and (Wˆ1, Wˆ2, · · ·, WˆK) the decoded messages. Thus, for any ǫ>0 and n large
enough, there exists a code of length n such that Pr[Wˆk 6=Wk]≤ ǫ at each of the K receivers,
and
1
n
H(Wk|W1, · · · ,Wk−1,Wk+1, · · · ,WK , Y ne , γLe , FL) ≥ Rk−ǫ, (70)
with FL={FL1 , FL2 , · · ·, FLK}, and Fk(l)∈{τ1, · · ·, τQ} is the feedback information sent by receiver
k in the l-th fading block. Now, we consider the transmission of messageW=(W1,W2, · · · ,WK)
to the genie-aided receiver using the same encoding scheme as for theK-receivers case. Adopting
a decoding scheme similar to the one used at each of the K legitimate receivers, it is clear that
the genie-aided receiver can decode message W with a negligible probability of error, i.e.,
Pr(Wˆ 6=W )≤ǫ. For the secrecy condition, we have
1
n
H(W |Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FLmax) =
1
n
H(W1,W2,· · ·,WK |Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FLmax) (71)
≥
K∑
k=1
1
n
H(Wk|W1,· · ·,Wk−1,Wk+1,· · ·,WK,Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FLmax) (72)
≥
K∑
k=1
1
n
H(Wk|W1,· · ·,Wk−1,Wk+1,· · ·,WK,Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FL) (73)
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≥
K∑
k=1
Rk−Kǫ, (74)
where FLmax={Fmax(1), · · ·, Fmax(L)} and Fmax(l) is the feedback information sent by the genie-
aided receiver in the l-th fading block, (73) follows from the fact that Fmax∈{F1, · · ·, FK} and
that conditioning reduces the entropy, and where (74) follows from the secrecy constraint (70).
Now, we need to prove that C+s upper bounds the secrecy capacity of the genie-aided channel.
Let Re be the equivocation rate of the new channel. We have
nRe = H(W |Y ne , γLe , γLmax, FLmax) (75)
= I(W;Y nmax|Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FLmax)+H(W |Y nmax,Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FLmax) (76)
≤ I(W ; Y nmax|Y ne , γLe , γLmax, FLmax)+nǫ (77)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
I(W;Ymax(l, k)|Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax, FLmax, Y κ(l−1)+(k−1)max )+nǫ (78)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
H(Ymax(l, k)|Y ne , γLe , γLmax, FLmax, Y κ(l−1)+(k−1)max )
−H(Ymax(l, k)|W,Y ne ,γLe ,γLmax,FLmax,Y κ(l−1)+(k−1)max )+nǫ (79)
≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
H(Ymax(l, k)|Ye(l, k), γe(l), γmax(l), F lmax) (80)
−H(Ymax(l, k)|W,X(l, k),Y ne , γLe ,γLmax,FLmax,Y κ(l−1)+(k−1)max )+nǫ
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
H(Ymax(l, k)|Ye(l, k), γe(l), γmax(l), F lmax) (81)
−H(Ymax(l, k)|X(l, k), Ye(l, k), γe(l), γmax(l), F lmax)+nǫ
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
I(X(l,k);Ymax(l,k)|Ye(l, k),γe(l),γmax(l),F lmax)+nǫ (82)
≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
k=1
{
I(X(l, k); Ymax(l, k)|γmax(l), F lmax)− I(X(l, k); Ye(l, k)|γe(l), F lmax)
}+
+nǫ (83)
=
L∑
l=1
κ
{
I(X(l); Ymax(l)|γmax(l), F lmax)− I(X(l); Ye(l)|γe(l), F lmax)
}+
+nǫ, (84)
where inequality (77) follows from the fact that
H(W |Y nmax, Y ne , γLe , γLmax, FLmax)≤H(W |Y nmax, γLmax, FLmax),
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and Fano’s inequalityH(W |Y nmax, γLmax, FLmax)≤nǫ, and (83) holds true by selecting the appropriate
value for the noise correlation to form the Markov chain X(l)→Ymax(l)→Ye(l) if γmax(l)>γe(l)
or X(l)→Ye(l)→Ymax(l) if γmax(l)≤γe(l), as explained in [6].
The right-hand side of (84) is maximized by a Gaussian input. That is, taking X(l) ∼
CN
(
0, ω
1/2
l (F
l
max)
)
, with the power policy ωl(F
l
max) satisfying the average power constraint,
we can write
nRe ≤ κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)ωl(F
l
max)
1+γe(l)ωl(F lmax)
)}+]
+nǫ (85)
= κ
L∑
l=1
E
[
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)ωl(F
l
max)
1+γe(l)ωl(F lmax)
)}+∣∣∣∣Fmax(l), γmax(l), γe(l)
]]
+nǫ (86)
≤ κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)E[ωl(F lmax)|Fmax(l),γmax(l),γe(l)]
1+γe(l)E[ωl(F lmax)|Fmax(l),γmax(l),γe(l)]
)}+]
+nǫ (87)
= κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmax(l)Ωl(Fmax(l))
1+γe(l)Ωl(Fmax(l))
)}+]
+nǫ (88)
= κ
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmaxΩl(Fmax)
1+γeΩl(Fmax)
)}+]
+nǫ, (89)
where (87) is obtained using Jensen’s inequality, Ωl(Fmax(l)) in (88) is defined as
Ωl(Fmax(l))=E
[
ωl(F
l
max)|Fmax(l), γmax(l), γe(l)
]
,
and where (89) follows from the ergodicity and the stationarity of the channel gains, i.e., the
expectation in (88) does not depend on the block fading index. Thus, we have
Re ≤ 1
L
L∑
l=1
E
[{
log
(
1+γmaxΩl(Fmax)
1+γeΩl(Fmax)
)}+]
+ǫ (90)
≤ E
[{
log
(
1+γmaxΩ(Fmax)
1+γeΩ(Fmax)
)}+]
+ ǫ, (91)
where (91) comes from applying Jensen’s inequality once again, with Ω(Fmax)=
1
L
L∑
l=1
Ωl(Fmax).
Maximizing over the main channel gain reconstruction points τq and the associated power
transmission strategies Pq, for each q ∈ {1, · · · , Q}, concludes the proof. 
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We provide the proof of achievability and the converse for the ergodic secrecy capacity region
of the multi-users BCCM with a 1-bit CSI feedback, presented in Theorem 3. In this scenario,
only one bit of CSI feedback is sent to the transmitter by an entity that knows the CSI of all
system users, e.g., a central controller or one of the receivers when they know each others’ CSI.
A. Proof of Achievability
Since the transmission is controlled by the feedback information, we consider that, during each
fading block, the 1-bit feedback indicates to the transmitter whether the channel to R/E is better
than those to the legitimate receivers, i.e., the feedback is equal to one when min1≤k≤K E [γk] >
γe and equal to zero otherwise. The achievability follows from [3, Corollary 1] by choosing the
following input distributions:
• For γ∈A, U∼CN (0,√p01),X ′∼CN (0,√p1), withX ′ independent of U and V=X=U+X ′;
• For γ∈Ac, U=V=X∼CN (0,√p02),
where A = {γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe}, U and V are the auxiliary random variables defined in
[3], and the transmission powers p01, p02, p1 are chosen to satisfy
Pr[γ∈A] (p01+p1)+Pr[γ∈Ac] p02≤Pavg.
Note that since we are considering a multi-users scenario in this work, we need to ensure that the
common message is decodable at all system users, including R/E, and the confidential message
is only decodable at the legitimate receivers. Hence, the minimum in the expressions of the
secrecy rates.1
B. Proof of the Converse
− Bound on the Common Rate R0: Let FL={F (1), F (2), · · · , F (L)}, with F (l) ∈ {0, 1}
being the feedback information sent in the l-th fading block, l ∈ {1, · · · , L}, and let γK+1=γe
and YK+1=Ye in this part of the proof. Considering the transmission to the k
th system user,
k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, we have
nR0 = H(W0|FL) (92)
1Even though [3] considers a two-users case, the achievability proof can be easily adapted to our CCMs system by considering
the transmission to R/E and to the legitimate receiver with the worst channel (on average).
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= I(W0; Y
n
k |FL) +H(W0|FL, Y nk ) (93)
≤ I(W0; Y nk |FL) + nη1 (94)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
I(W0; Yk(l, j)|FL, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k ) + nη1 (95)
≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
I(W0,Y
[κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]
K+1 ;Yk(l, j)|FL,Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k )+nη1 (96)
≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
I(W0,Y
[κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]
K+1 ,Y
κ(l−1)+(j−1)
k ;Yk(l, j)|FL)+nη1, (97)
where (94) is obtained using Fano’s inequality. By defining the following auxiliary random
variable U(l, j) = (W0,Y
[κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]
K+1 ,Y
κ(l−1)+(j−1)
k ), we can write
nR0 ≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) + nη1 (98)
=
∑
l∈A
κ∑
j=1
I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) +
∑
l∈Ac
κ∑
j=1
I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) + nη1 (99)
On one hand, when l ∈ Ac, we have
I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) ≤ I(X(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) (100)
= I(X(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, hk(l)) (101)
≤ E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
1+γk(l)ωl(F
l)
) ∣∣γ(l)∈Ac] , (102)
where (100) follows from U(l, j)→X(l, j)→Yk(l, j) is a Markov chain, (101) holds since given
FL, X(l, j) is independent of h1(l), and (102) results since a Gaussian X maximizes the right
hand side of (101), with ωl(F
l) = E
[|X(l, j)|2∣∣F l].
On the other hand, when l ∈ A, we have
I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) = I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, hk(l)) (103)
= H(Yk(l, j)|FL,hk(l))−H(Yk(l, j)
∣∣U(l, j),FL,hk(l)), (104)
where (103) follows since given FL, U(l, j) is independent of hk(l), with
H(Yk(l, j)
∣∣U(l, j), FL, hk(l)) ≤ H(Yk(l, j)∣∣FL, hk(l)) (105)
= E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
πe
(
1+γk(l)δl(F
l)
)) ∣∣γ(l)∈A] , (106)
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where (106) follows by taking X(l, j)∼CN
(
0,
√
δl(F l)
)
, and
H(Yk(l, j)
∣∣U(l, j), FL, hk(l)) ≥ H(Yk(l, j)∣∣X(l, j), FL, hk(l)) (107)
= log πe. (108)
Hence, there exists 0 ≤ αl ≤ 1 such that
H(Yk(l, j)
∣∣U(l, j), FL, hk(l)) = E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
πe
(
1+γk(l)αlδl(F
l)
)) ∣∣γ(l)∈A] . (109)
We can then write
I(U(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL) ≤ E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
πe
(
1+γk(l)δl(F
l)
)) ∣∣γ(l)∈A]
− E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
πe
(
1+γk(l)αlδl(F
l)
)) ∣∣γ(l)∈A] (110)
= E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
1+
γk(l)(1−αl)δl(F l)
1+γk(l)αlδl(F l)
) ∣∣∣γ(l)∈A] . (111)
Substituting (102) and (111) in (99), we get
nR0 ≤
∑
l∈A
κ E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
1+
γk(l)(1−αl)δl(F l)
1+γk(l)αlδl(F l)
) ∣∣∣γ(l)∈A]
+
∑
l∈Ac
κ E
F l,γ(l)
[
log
(
1+γk(l)ωl(F
l)
) ∣∣γ(l)∈Ac]+nηk. (112)
Noting that E
F l
[.] = E
F (l)
[
E
F l−1
[.|F (l)]
]
, and applying Jensen’s inequality, we get
R0 ≤ 1
L
∑
l∈A
E
F (l),
γ(l)
[
log
(
1+
γk(l)(1−αl)∆l(F (l))
1+γk(l)αl∆l(F (l))
)∣∣∣γ(l)∈A]
+
1
L
∑
l∈Ac
E
F (l),
γ(l)
[
log(1+γk(l)Ωl(F (l)))
∣∣γ(l)∈Ac]+ηk (113)
=
1
L
∑
l∈A
E
F (l),γ
[
log
(
1+
γk(1−αl)∆l(F (l))
1+γkαl∆l(F (l))
)∣∣∣γ∈A]
+
1
L
∑
l∈Ac
E
F (l),γ
[
log(1+γkΩl(F (l)))
∣∣γ∈Ac]+ηk, (114)
with ∆l(F (l))= E
F l−1
[
δl(F
l)
∣∣F (l)], Ωl(F (l))= E
F l−1
[
ωl(F
l)
∣∣F (l)], and (114) follows from the er-
godicity and the stationarity of the channel gain. Applying Jensen’s inequality once again, we get
R0 ≤ E
γ
log
1+
γk
LA
∑
l∈A
(1−αl)∆l(F (l))
1+
γk
LA
∑
l∈A
αl∆l(F (l))

∣∣∣∣∣γ∈A
Pr[γ∈A]
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+ E
γ
[
log
(
1+
γk
LAc
∑
l∈Ac
Ωl(F (l))
)∣∣∣γ∈Ac]Pr[γ∈Ac]+ηk, (115)
where LA = Pr
[
γ∈A]L and LAc = Pr[γ∈Ac]L. Then, by taking Ω(F ) = 1
LAc
∑
l∈Ac
Ωl(F (l)),
∆1(F ) =
1
LA
∑
l∈A
(1− αl)∆l(F (l)), and ∆2(F ) = 1
LA
∑
l∈A
αl∆l(F (l)), we can write
R0 ≤ E
γ
[
log
(
1+
γk∆1(F )
1+γk∆2(F )
)∣∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A]
+ E
γ
[
log(1+γkΩ(F ))
∣∣γ∈Ac]Pr[γ∈Ac]+ηk, (116)
with Pr[γ∈A] (∆1(F )+∆2(F ))+Pr[γ∈Ac] Ω(F )≤Pavg.
A similar reasoning is applied for the case k=K+1. Then, since the choice of the receiver to
transmit to is arbitrary, we tighten this upper bound by choosing the system user that minimizes
this quantity. Then, using the fact that F=ρ(γ), where ρ(.), is a deterministic mapping, and taking
ηk arbitrary small, we get the outer boundary on the common rate R0, presented in Theorem 3.
− Bound on the Confidential Rate R1: Let k ∈ {1, · · · , K}. We have
nR1 ≤ nRe (117)
= H(W1|FL, γL, Y ne ) (118)
= I(W1;W0|FL, γL, Y ne )+H(W1|FL, γL,W0, Y ne ) (119)
≤ I(W1; Y nk |FL, γL,W0)−I(W1; Y ne |FL, γL,W0)
+H(W1|FL, γL,W0, Y nk )+H(W0|FL, γL, Y ne ) (120)
≤ I(W1; Y nk |FL, γL,W0)−I(W1; Y ne |FL, γL,W0)+n(ηk+η′) (121)
=
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
{
I(W1; Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k )
− I(W1; Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e )
}
+nη′k (122)
=
∑
l,j
{
I(W1, Y
[κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]
e ; Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k )
− I(Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e ; Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W1,W0, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k )
− I(W1, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k ; Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e )
+ I(Y
κ(l−1)+(j−1)
k ; Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W1,W0, Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e )
}
+nη′k (123)
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=
∑
l,j
{
I(W1, Y
[κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]
e ; Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k )
− I(W1, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k ; Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e )
}
+nη′k (124)
=
∑
l,j
{
I(W1; Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k , Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e )
− I(W1; Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l),W0, Y κ(l−1)+(j−1)k , Y [κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]e )
}
+nη′k, (125)
where (121) is obtained using Fano’s inequality, (124) and (125) follow from Lemma 7 in [3],
and η′k=ηk+η
′. By defining U(l, j)=(W0,Y
[κ(l−1)+(j+1),n]
e ,Y
κ(l−1)+(j−1)
k ), V (l, j)=(W1, U(l, j)), such
that U(l, j)→V (l, j)→X(l, j)→(Yk(l, j), Ye(l, j)) is a Markov chain, we can write
nR1 ≤
L∑
l=1
κ∑
j=1
{
I(V (l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
−I(V (l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
}
+nη′k. (126)
When l ∈ Ac, we have
I(V (l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))− I(V (l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
≤ I(V (l, j); Yk(l, j), Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
− I(V (l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j)) (127)
= I(V (l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
+ I(V (l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l), Ye(l, j), U(l, j))
− I(V (l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j)) (128)
= 0, (129)
where (129) results since X(l, j)→Yk(l, j)→Ye(l, j) is a Markov chain when l∈Ac. Hence, we
have
R1 ≤ 1
n
∑
l∈A
κ∑
j=1
{
I(V (l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
−I(V (l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
}
+η′k (130)
≤ 1
n
∑
l∈A
κ∑
j=1
{
I(X(l, j); Yk(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
−I(X(l, j); Ye(l, j)|FL, γ(l), U(l, j))
}
+η′k (131)
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≤ E
γ
[
log(1+γk∆2(F ))− log(1+γe∆2(F ))
∣∣∣γ∈A]Pr[γ∈A]+η′k, (132)
where (132) follows along similar lines as for the common rate case. We, then, tighten this upper
bound by choosing the legitimate user that minimizes this quantity. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
The achievability follows by considering the same feedback scheme as in Theorem 3, i.e.,
during each fading block, the 1-bit feedback indicates to the transmitter which channel is better
(the feedback is equal to one when min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe and equal to zero otherwise). Besides,
we consider that the confidential message is only transmitted over the coherence blocks where
the feedback bit is not erased and is equal to one. The input distributions are chosen, in this
case, as follows
• When γ∈A and no erasure occurs, U∼CN (0,√p01), X ′∼CN (0,√p1), withX ′ independent
of U and V=X=U+X ′;
• When γ∈Ac or when an erasure occurs, U = V = X∼CN (0,√p02),
where A = {γ : min1≤k≤K E [γk] > γe}, U and V are the auxiliary random variables defined in
[3], and the transmission powers p01, p02, p1 are chosen to satisfy
(p01+p1) Pr[γ∈A and no erasure occurs] + p02 Pr[γ∈Ac or an erasure occurs]≤Pavg, (133)
which reduces to (p01+p1)(1−ǫ) Pr[γ∈A]+p02
(
ǫ+(1−ǫ)Pr[γ∈Ac])≤Pavg. 
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